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continental philosophers. Remarkably, references 
to analytic philosophy remained distinctly absent 
within the primary sources of architecture history 
and theory. 
In essence, one could argue that philosophy 
and architecture make natural bedfellows, as they 
seek to understand some of the most fundamental 
concerns of human existence: the issue of shelter 
as the first architectural gesture is but a small step 
away from the ethical question: how do we wish to 
live, or what is the good life? The desire to house 
our institutions in purposeful, representative and 
significant edifices is intimately linked to issues 
of aesthetic judgment, and the question of how 
we perceive beauty (or a lack of it). At the same 
time, philosophy also questions our means of ques-
tioning, our means of the very discourse of inquiry 
through the study of knowledge and logic. The four 
core branches of philosophy – metaphysics, ethics, 
logic, and epistemology – have spawned count-
less further specialisations, which ebb and flow in 
popularity. While architecture thinking has freely 
adopted and adapted the continental philosophies 
of metaphysics and ethics, the domains of logic 
and epistemology have been less visible. While we 
acknowledge the limitations of a simplified distinc-
tion between two ‘camps’ of thinking, this issue of 
Footprint sought to open the discussion on what 
might be offered by the less familiar branches of 
epistemology and logic that are more prevalent and 
developed in the analytic tradition.1 
This issue of Footprint has travelled a long road. 
While our intuitions on the potential role of analytic 
philosophy began to crystallise in early form some 
time ago, it was only in beginning to set out the 
context of architecture in relation to its typical 
affinity with continental philosophy over the past 
three decades, that we began to explore some of 
the fundamental connections between philosophy 
and architecture. While philosophical approaches 
might be seen as part and parcel of architecture 
practice from its most clearly defined beginnings in 
Vitruvius’s well-known Ten Books on Architecture 
(ca 27 BCE), it is particularly in the last decades 
of the twentieth century that philosophy took centre 
stage. In the late 1980s, architecture positioned itself 
as meaningful cultural intervention with reference 
to many philosophical perspectives on the social 
and the aesthetic. In this period, numerous studies 
that would strictly speaking fall outside the realm 
of architecture were re-engaged. From the ethno-
graphic studies of Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques, 
to Deleuze and Guattari’s intellectual acrobatics in 
A Thousand Plateaus, to the existential questions 
in Heidegger’s Building Dwelling Thinking, many 
explorations of a highly cerebral nature were incor-
porated in the design premises of projects such as 
Peter Eisenman’s House VI, in Daniel Libeskind’s 
Micromegas and even in early work by Steven 
Holl to name but a few. Philosophy became an 
almost necessary springboard from which to define 
a work of architecture. In this period, academics 
and architects alike embraced ideas emerging 
from philosophy, particularly through the works of 
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2allow scholars to include and exclude people and 
ideas depending upon priorities of the argument. 
However, for the purposes of architecture thinking, 
it is interesting to consider Frege’s project in relation 
to the analytic camp and our current predicament of 
a post-truth era.
Logic formally emerged in Western culture 
with the ancient Greeks, and the logical system 
composed by Aristotle (384–322 BCE) remained 
dominant in scholastic circles for over a millen-
nium, only changing when Frege developed the 
modern formal system, which effectively constituted 
the first ‘predicate calculus’.7 Frege’s approach 
separated statements into function and argument, 
rather than the more traditional subject and predi-
cate of Aristotle’s logic. Predicate calculus helped 
separate the logical content from the sign through 
which its function was expressed. As such, a group 
of statements became possible independent of the 
content of the signs. Frege’s explicative system 
of language utilisation is the underlying reasoning 
from which he abstracts two arguments for the inde-
finability of truth. Frege claims that by employing 
language, people intend to denote objects that are 
independent of their own consciousness. These 
denoted objects are the meaning of these signs, the 
Bedeutung. Here, we adhere to the original German 
term Bedeutung due to its particular ontological 
status in the work of Frege. As he explains it, by 
uttering a sentence, we intend to speak about the 
objective things denoted by the sentence. However, 
sometimes there are situations in which a person 
believes one sentence that has a certain Bedeutung 
and not another that has the identical Bedeutung. 
Such situations demonstrate a rift between the 
sentence and its Bedeutung. Consider the following 
example of John: John believes that the sentence, 
‘The Evening Star is Venus’ is true, but John does 
not believe that the sentence, ‘The Morning Star 
is Venus’ is true. For Frege, both individual words 
and whole sentences have a Bedeutung. The 
Bedeutungen of these two sentences are identical. 
Simply put, epistemology as it formally emerged 
with Plato (427–347 BCE), is the study of how we 
know that we know. It examines the justifications of 
knowledge and why we are able to claim something 
is true and something else is not, or why we can 
have a justified true belief.2 In 2016, the algorithms 
and lexicographers at Oxford Dictionaries declared 
‘post-truth’ to be the word of the year.3 Other promi-
nent Anglo-Saxon media groups such as Forbes, 
the New York Times, and the Huffington Post 
announced our societal entry into a post-truth era, 
age, or political arena.4 As provocative and sugges-
tive as these statements are, however, we can 
hardly claim to have had an ‘era of truth’: truth has 
never been a simple or straightforward thing, but 
rather a complex narrative of power, perspectives, 
(scientific) observations, individual interests and 
political engagements, even in the so-called ‘hard’ 
sciences.5 While areas of continental philosophy 
such as post-structuralism and deconstruction have 
helped clarify the discourses of power and identify 
alternative perspectives, there may in this time of 
‘post-truth’ be a pointed role for the clarifying tools 
and techniques of analytic philosophy. 
Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), G.E. Moore (1873–
1958), Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and to a lesser 
degree, Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) are widely 
considered as central figures in the foundation of 
analytic philosophy. Frege in particular is gener-
ally taken as the grandfather of analytic philosophy, 
founding the modern logic that would drive Russell’s 
later Principia Mathematica, with the two-volume 
work: Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch 
mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff 
der Zahl (The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-
Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number), 
published in 1884. Although it should be noted 
that some have cited Frege’s aim of ‘demonstra-
tion that arithmetic had its foundations in pure logic 
alone’ as reason to reject his influence in founding 
analytic philosophy.6 The analytic approach can 
be explained at a multitude of levels, which would 
3we find that sentences of the privileged asser-
toric sentence-form that make serious claims can 
express a true thought.12 This is because only an 
assertion makes a claim about objective reality. The 
assertion claims a truth about objective reality. An 
assertoric sentence can express a true thought. 
Hence, assertions presuppose the concept of truth. 
Definitions are assertions. Thus the correspond-
ence theory presupposes an understanding of truth, 
in that it asserts something about reality. Likewise, 
the redundancy theory draws upon Frege’s struc-
turing of language to claim that truth is already 
presupposed in an assertoric sentence, so any 
further predication of truth merely repeats the prior 
assumption. 
Frege lays out the following premises to clarify 
his application of the concept of truth: first, he is 
concerned with the scientific concept of truth and 
not the artistic concept of truth. This may be under-
stood as Frege’s plea to be taken as within the 
objective field of reason, as opposed to within the 
artistic concerns of genuineness or veraciousness. 13 
Secondly, truth is only applicable to intentions. 14 The 
truth that Frege calls into question is the concept of 
truth, and hence an intentional phenomenon. It is in 
the sense of objective thought that truth looks like 
a property of an intentional statement. Something 
is called true ‘only with respect to an intention that 
the idea should correspond to something’.15 Thirdly, 
truth is not a relative term.16 If truth were a relative 
term, then the term itself would give some indication 
of something else to which it was to correspond. 
However, the term truth does not suggest that with 
which it is intended to correspond. 
The importance of establishing the link between 
language, truth, and something independent in 
reality (Bedeutung) was key to Frege’s primary 
project of establishing an unlimited language that 
reached logical truths. In other words, Frege was 
interested in a means of communication that dealt 
with logical truths. Although Frege’s work gave birth 
Hence, John’s belief in the truth of one sentence 
and not the other shows that language allows the 
Bedeutung to present itself in an additional form. 
This aspect is what Frege calls the ‘sense of the 
sentence’. Sometimes, but not always, the sense of 
a sentence is a thought.8 A sentence with compo-
nents that assert something expresses a thought.9 
The sense of a sentence is the way in which the 
sentence is understood or grasped. The sense 
of a sentence accounts for the discrepancy that 
language affords between a sentence and its 
Bedeutung. In this case, John understands the 
Bedeutung of both sentences and only the thought 
of the first sentence.
A sentence may also have a sense and not a 
Bedeutung, e.g. ‘In the end, it was Hippolytus’s 
devotion to Artemis that sealed his fate’. Here 
the sentence has a sense; that Aphrodite will not 
stand by, while Hippolytus boasts of being chaste 
in honour of Artemis. However, Hippolytus and 
Artemis are mere fictions, and cannot denote any 
object in reality; that is, the words do not assert 
anything. Therefore, the sentence as a whole does 
not have a Bedeutung. Notice that the sentence has 
an assertoric form. Sentences that have a sense, 
but not a Bedeutung, do not assert anything about 
reality; however, due to their assertoric form, a 
thought is expressed. These types of sentences are 
employed in poetry, acting, and as the dependent 
clause of a conditional sentence;10 in short, when 
‘we are not speaking seriously’.11 Because these 
sentences do not make claims about reality, they 
are neither true nor false. Hence, truth and falsity 
are not applicable to fantasy or fiction. Additionally, 
the sense of the sentence, or in privileged cases, 
the thought, must be grasped to understand the 
sentence. It is this structure that grounds Frege’s 
argument for the indefinability of truth. It is within 
his network of concepts that he finds that some 
concepts defy definition. 
Drawing upon Frege’s structuring of language, 
4inevitability Frege eventually accepted.18 
Frege proposed the existence of a logical 
language that when it was appropriately set up, 
could be employed to resolve complex philosoph-
ical questions. It was a totalising project much akin 
to what Michel Foucault would later describe as 
continental philosophy, noting that ‘from Hegel to 
Sartre [continental philosophy] has essentially been 
a totalising enterprise’. 19 In the end, given Russell’s 
paradox of the set of all sets, Frege conceded that 
any philosophical language was only valid within 
the parameters it established. Nevertheless, later 
analytic philosophers acknowledged the tools that 
propositional logic provided and set out to estab-
lish ways of discussing philosophy issues with the 
analytic structure and rules but in the more widely 
accessible language of English. The shortcom-
ings of analytic philosophy were thus immediately 
visible: an almost historical portrayal of philosophy, 
arguments abstracted from their lived context, and 
a necessarily, artificially limited domain (as proven 
by Russell’s Paradox). However the core strength 
that fuelled its relevance in twentieth century Anglo-
Saxon thought was that it provided both a platform 
and a linear structure to compare diverse and 
complex philosophical questions.
The strength analytic philosophy offers to archi-
tecture is not its capacity to spark originality, 
creative artworks, or ideas and objects that can live 
and thrive in the complexities of an ever-emerging 
world. The power of analytic philosophy is to reduce 
the challenges of communication to classifiable and 
manageable boxes that can help us to communicate 
across the chasms of emotions, circumstances, and 
pre-determined understandings. As all of us who 
have witnessed the political shifts in the last year 
are well aware, the challenge of establishing a func-
tioning cohesion of will, power and ideas that may 
begin to adequately address the plethora of prob-
lems inherent to our shared global society, will not be 
resolved by labels or witty word play. For example, 
to the philosophy of language, modern logic, and 
predicate calculus, the fundamental aim of reaching 
an unconditional logic through the language of math-
ematics alone was ultimately proven impossible by 
Russell’s Paradox. The paradox disproved Frege’s 
Basic Law V. Frege defines numbers explicitly as 
extensions of concepts. Frege’s explicit definition of 
numbers states: ‘The Number which belongs to the 
concept F is the extension of the concept “equal to 
the concept F”’.17 This attempt to define numbers 
draws upon the understanding that if given any 
concept F, then the notion of equinumerosity can be 
used to define the concept ranging over concepts. 
That is, ‘equal to the concept F’ is the concept of 
equinumerosity that ranges over the concept F and 
the extension. By these means, Frege collects all 
of the equinumerous concepts to a given concept F 
into a single extension. Frege defines 0 as Number 
x (x ≠ x) and defines 1 as Number x (x = 0), that 
is, as Number x (x = Number y (y ≠ y)). With these 
definitions of 0 and 1, Frege utilises mixed identi-
ties. With the inclusion of extensions, the paradox 
arises by considering the set of all sets that are not 
members of themselves. Such a set appears to be 
a member of itself if and only if it is not a member 
of itself, hence the paradox. Some sets, such as the 
set of all coffee beans, are not members of them-
selves. Other sets, such as the set of all non-coffee 
beans, are members of themselves. So if we call 
the set of all sets that are not members of them-
selves S, if S is a member of itself, then by definition 
it must not be a member of itself. Similarly, if S is not 
a member of itself, then by definition it must be a 
member of itself. Russell’s paradox stems from the 
notion that any condition may be used as an exten-
sion. Therefore, attempts at resolving the paradox 
have typically concentrated on various means of 
restricting the principles governing the existence of 
extensions. Restricting the domain, however, is not 
a move Frege was ultimately willing to make. Any 
restriction of the domain would render the method 
detached from pure logic, therefore becoming 
an arbitrary model of knowledge – which was an 
5could be, and then through sequences of both self-
critique and critique by others, amend, adapt, and 
defend the idea of our object. This issue of Footprint 
sought to focus on this smaller strategic aspect of 
architecture. 
A particular strength of analytic philosophy is its 
capacity to structure questions and communica-
tion such that individuals from radically different 
backgrounds can find common ground. This meth-
odology is inherently reductive, but affords the 
possibility of a shared medium. The method is to 
define a boundary, set, or environment, to estab-
lish the rules operating within that environment, 
and only then to debate. As architects and citizens, 
this skill of creating an environment for discourse 
(albeit an ephemeral and artificially limited one) is 
essential in our current period of claims of truth justi-
fied by impassioned emotions. In other words, we 
cannot pretend that the logical rules that operate 
in our own way of understanding the world, are 
shared by others in our society. We cannot remain 
confused as to why our ‘rational’ arguments are 
not convincing the other of our truth. If an aim is to 
achieve a means of addressing any of the political 
challenges, we must come to a point where we can 
project ourselves into the logical environment of the 
other.
As editors and scholars, we grant the significance 
that continental philosophy offers the individual 
creative process of generating architecture, and 
also the intellectual imperative for understanding 
the ethical, historical, and political context of our 
field and practice. Nevertheless, the time is ripe to 
question if anything from the analytic camp could be 
brought back into the fold of architecture thinking. 
Might the architecture debate benefit from the less 
central traditions of analytic philosophy and of prag-
matism, as they offer the means to address finite, 
localised, and tangible issues within architecture? 
The field of architecture has developed significantly 
since Vitruvius first set out the study necessary to the 
the morning after the Brexit referendum, one of 
the editors of this issue walked to work in a part of 
the UK which predominately voted ‘out’. She is not 
English and from across the street a man yelled, 
‘Now you have to go home!’ The next day, she flew 
to Berlin, where Tegel Airport has positioned immi-
gration control stations at each gate. As passengers 
filed off the short flight from London, each passed a 
desk to show their passport and have their finger-
prints taken. At this gate there were two desks, each 
with an EU flag over it. Yet when speaking English 
at the desk, she received an aggressive response: 
‘you are not part of the EU anymore, this desk is for 
EU members only’. Other members from the crowd 
yelled, ‘Die Engländer waren niemals Europäer, es 
ist die Zeit, die sie verlassen haben!’ (The English 
were never European, it is time they left! ), another 
yelled, ‘She is still Human, we are all Human’. For 
context, much of her family lives in Berlin, but in 
this case, she was travelling on a New Zealand 
passport. In essence, she was neither English nor 
German enough to enter without emotions erupting. 
Returning to the States in February of 2017 was no 
less of an event. At this temporal junction emotions 
and ‘alternative facts’ are driving actions. In order 
to protect the rights fought for in the last century 
and currently accepted as default or even universal 
rights, we must be strategic and not emotional. 
For an individual traversing the urban landscape 
and negotiating political constructs at multiple 
scales, an immediate issue is not whose truth is 
‘better’; the issue is how to communicate with the 
other enough to move through the metaphorical or 
physical border crossing. To create as architects, 
one must have an idea of the possible object, yet 
creation also requires the skill to pass through these 
checkpoints of convincing the other – the patron 
who funds the production, the local planning officers 
who legalise the project, and the contractors who 
physically constructs the structure – that one’s idea 
of a particular building is valid, is true. In creating 
an architectural object we generate an idea of what 
6Pauline Lefebvre’s ‘What Difference Could 
Pragmatism Have Made? From Architectural 
Effects to Architecture’s Consequences’ addresses 
how a pragmatist critique of architecture may help 
escape the constraints of market-led architecture. 
If Gough’s article re-establishes the subject of 
critique, Lefebvre’s demonstrates a new means of 
criticism. Lefebvre’s paper interrogates the post-
critical period of architecture in the early 2000s 
and rejects the reductionist simplification that left 
thinking subjected to the logic of the market. Her 
careful study of relevant architecture thinking at the 
time and of philosophical pragmatism offers a fresh 
form of communal and self-critique for the creative 
process of producing architecture. Lefebvre’s article 
is a powerful and highly accessible account of what 
pragmatism can offer, by forcing a wedge between 
the populist common sense mantra of pragmatism 
and the rigorous philosophical structure of pragma-
tism that takes the object as always in-the-making 
rather than statically complete. 
Design processes in architecture and urbanism 
by their very nature have a strongly defined rela-
tion to the legislative and regulatory structures of 
urban master plans, and architectural and structural 
building codes. For example, in 2010 when asked 
how he could build such surreal spaces, architect 
Terunobu Fujimori replied that in Japan, structures 
smaller than ten square meters did not require 
building consent. Analytic philosophy in this case 
may offer a perspective that grasps these particular 
interventions as experiments in expanding the role 
of the architect within a highly constrained field. 
In this sense, Fujimori’s response becomes an 
example of finding alternate solutions for localised 
obstacles; for understanding the limits and internal 
logic of the other and finding a way to traverse its 
trappings.
In ‘The Triumph of Function over Form. The role 
of analytic philosophy in planning and analysing 
profession. Might increasing complexities emerging 
in this field, for example the ethical implications 
of new materials, the increasing independence of 
algorithms, or the legal incentive to copyright one’s 
practice, benefit from an approach informed by 
the finely detailed scholarship of thinkers such as 
Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine? Might the 
more recent scholarship of Jackson, Dummett, and 
Oswald Hanfling offer method, style, and findings 
to the scrutiny of architectural thinkers? Might the 
emphasis on rule-based systems, clarity of argu-
ment and formal logic in the analytic tradition aid 
in understanding the conditions within which archi-
tecture is realised? As such, this issue of Footprint 
should be taken as the opening of a conversation 
rather than its definitive statement. As an initial 
question, it provides a broad span of articles that 
each takes elements of analytic philosophy, building 
on the premises of a systematic mode of communi-
cation and a mode of inquiry that may provide new 
insights for the theory and practice of architecture.
This issue begins with Tim Gough’s article 
‘G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica and the Complex of 
Architecture’. Beyond providing a clear and precise 
account of analytic philosophy’s role and positioning 
it within the history of ideas, Gough’s reading of 
Moore’s Principia Ethica provides fresh insight into 
the concept of an organic whole. The article lays 
out the complexity of the abstract philosophy issue 
with great care and in detail, and then applies this 
analysis of Moore’s organic whole and the notion 
that some concepts are above further scrutiny to 
the practice of architecture. In so doing, it provides 
a context for architectural judgments beyond the 
criteria of contemporaneous style or technical 
coherence. The limitation of acting in accordance 
with certain criteria raises the question whether 
there is another means of analysing good architec-
ture. For those unfamiliar with Moore’s final chapter 
his identification of the two highest forms the good 
may come as a surprise. 
7to the ever changing bio-political ecosystem within 
which we work.
Much akin to the study of personal identity, 
Fabio Bacchini’s ‘The Persistence of Building and 
the Context Problem’ directs the classic analytical 
issue of identity over time towards a collection of 
noteworthy examples of architecture. The identity-
over-time question centres on the issue of change, 
on the question how an object can change yet be 
the same object before and after the event. In other 
words, can we observe change in action, and if so, 
how?20
Returning to a philosophy that suggests a 
fresh bridge between theory and practice, David 
Macarthur’s ‘Reflections on Pragmatism as a 
Philosophy of Architecture’ closes the issue. In 
accordance with Lefebvre’s ‘What difference could 
Pragmatism have made? From architectural effects 
to architecture’s consequences’, Macarthur points to 
the significant project of Joan Ockman at the turn of 
the century. However, Macarthur directs the inquiry 
to put pragmatism and architectural ‘philosophical 
vampires’ into the wider philosophical context reas-
serting and clarifying the role of philosophy as an 
orientation towards thinking rather than an ideo-
logical theory. The article particularly provides a 
rereading of the criticality vs post-criticality debate 
in the light of this nuanced contextual of pragmatism 
within both the fields of philosophy and the archi-
tecture of Rem Koolhaas. In concluding it draws 
out four relevant ramifications of philosophy for the 
practice of architecture. 
This issue of Footprint brings together papers 
searching for another means of criticality in 
architecture discourse that are not subjected to 
personalities, specialist knowledge of individual 
philosophies, or dependent on presumed opera-
tional logic. Rather the various articles attempt to 
demonstrate that such difference of background 
assumptions is a common human habit and that 
modern architecture’ Borbála Jász provides a 
nuanced case study of architecture emerging from 
twentieth-century central European intellectual 
culture; a mode of thinking that significantly contrib-
uted to and established analytic philosophy. Akin 
to Japanese regulations setting the boundaries of 
Fujimori’s work, Borbála Jász draws out the impli-
cations of the political will on architecture through 
significant moments of the twentieth century. 
As such, the article provides a case history of 
employing an analytic form of criticism to the crea-
tion and production of architecture.
Picking up on the contributing philosophers of 
the Vienna Circle, Andrea Dutto’s ‘The Mosaic 
and the Pyramid: Otto Neurath’s Encyclopedism 
as a Critical Model’ delves deeply into the details 
of key players, in particular Otto Neurath and his 
adaptation of Marxism in city planning and building 
production, getting down to the technicalities of 
analytic philosophy language issues.
We each engage the creative process uniquely, 
yet at some point we must learn how to refine 
our craft. In teaching others or developing our 
own perceptive process, we build upon layers of 
previous learnt skills and means of structuring the 
world. Pickersgill’s ‘Possibilia: Possible Worlds 
and the Limitless in Architecture’ offers another 
approach to critically understanding the signifi-
cance of critique for the process of architecture. In 
the process of creating design there are moments 
when we inevitably hit a wall; Pickersgill presents 
how logic and modal logic may help those it reso-
nates with to critique their own work to develop and 
push the project forward. Pickersgill offers the tools 
developed in analytic philosophy, particularly logic 
and modal logic for the use of architectural critique. 
Architecture is both an individual and shared 
dialogue, whether it is with oneself at the desk or 
with students at review sessions, or in journals as 
reviewers, at its best architectural critique pushes 
our discipline forward, ever adjusting and adapting 
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some of the techniques of analytic philosophy 
may help to leap these chasms between ‘alterna-
tive facts’. The hope is that this is a start of a larger 
conversation in architecture theory that has as of 
yet not begun.
In closing, we would like to pay tribute to Professor 
Hubert Dreyfus who passed away this spring and is 
greatly missed. As this issue was in its final stages, 
his passing signified the loss of a generous and 
open-minded scholar. Dreyfus was interested in 
phenomenology and existentialism, via Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Kierkegaard. Dreyfus 
above all else honoured the pursuit of knowledge 
in order to get at the phenomenon itself. One of 
Dreyfus’s most admirable habits was his ability to 
take any question, however mundane, and draw 
from it the most provocative and insightful point, 
as though his very comportment to the world was 
an authentic pursuit of knowledge, that engaged 
the other as a friend. In calling for this issue on 
analytic philosophy our aim was not to undermine 
the wealth of knowledge continental philosophy 
continues to generate; but rather to bring those 
aspects of analytic philosophy that pursue the same 
phenomena, back into the fold of our shared history 
of ideas.
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